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Statement of the Case: 
Dr. Pines' appeal discipline in this matter largely turns on Board's failure to apply 
the evidence in the record to the statutes and regulations. Rather than applying the actual 
language of Idaho law to their own evidence, the Board relies, and now argues, that its Final 
Order is supported by its own expertise. That precise reliance has been repeatedly rejected by 
this Court, and should be again. 
The Final Order fails constitutional review as it relies upon uncharged conduct and 
violates fundamental principles of due process. It fails statutory review given it drew 
conclusions that are not supported by any evidence. The Final Order also fails procedurally as it 
does not provide a factual basis for its conclusions, functionally lacks findings of fact, and rejects 
the Hearing Officer's proposed order without an adequate explanation supporting the departure. 
Coupled with the violations of due process, statutory, and procedural shortcomings, the 
Final Order's conclusions lack any substantial evidentiary support. The Board has drawn 
conclusions that contradict their own complaining witnesses, their own expert, law enforcement, 
and the record. It has therefore failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the charged 
conduct violated the statutes or regulations, and rather, opted to rely on their own unstated 
"understandings" to find a violation of 
this matter dismissed. 
see 
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and statute. The Final Order must be set aside, and 
Legal Authority: 
s 
IV. Attornev Fees on Appeal: 
The Appellant is not seeking to recover attorney fees on appeal. 
V. Issues Presented on Appeal and Arguments: 
a. Dr. Pines' right to due process has been violated by being disciplined for uncharged 
conduct. 
Because the Final Order repeatedly bases its conclusions on allegations that were not 
contained in the Complaint, Dr. Pines' due process rights were violated. The Board responds to 
this by arguing that any reference to "boys" was appropriate, and that the references to "minors" 
was "clearly a clerical error." See Respondent's Brief~ pp. 21-22. The Board then argues that it 
is "irrelevant what age they were when it occuned" and that any reference to minors was 
"haimless error." See Respondent's Briet: p. 21. 
While the Respondent characterizes the references to "boys" as appropriate, and now 
concedes that no evidence was presented to prove any illicit conduct with minors, the actual 
language of the Final Order focuses extensively on uncharged conduct. The first paragraph has a 
single sentence addressing the allegations in the Complaint, and six addressing activities with 
mmors. That theme continues throughout the Final Order: 
"As a physician, benefactor and foster/respite parent, he stood in a 
position of power, authority and supervision over these boys." 
[Final Order, p. 1] 
"He enabled them to participate in various activities such as going 
to ball games, dinner and to his Boise home and Garden City 
cabin." [Id.] 
"Dr. Pines admitted engaging in sexual activity such as naked 
massages, disrobing and asking the boys to disrobe in his presence 
while they were in his care."' [Id.] 
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"The evidence clearly establishes that Dr. Pines engaged in sexual 
exploitation with the four ( 4) boys, prior to them reaching the 
age of eighteen ( 18), while acting as a foster/respite parent, father 
figure, and benefactor." [p. 2]( emphasis added) 
"The Board was acutely aware that Dr. Pines acted and held 
himself out as a physician to these foster sons and other boy for the 
length of their stay with him." [Id.] 
"The evidence clearly establishes that Dr. Pines held himself out as 
a physician while engaging in sexual exploitation of these four ( 4) 
minors under the ruse they were practice patients." [p. 3] 
"Extensive testimony was presented documenting Dr. Pines 
"groomed" these boys by providing them with gifts, outings and 
giving each of these boys, after using the hot tub, naked massages 
on the floors of his bedroom at his Boise home and Garden Valley 
cabin." [p. 4) 
"Dr. Pines held himself out as a physician while engaging in 
sexual exploitation of these four (4) minors under the ruse they 
were 'practice patients."' [p. 4] 
See Agency R., Final Order. 
This Court has ruled repeatedly that the Board of Medicine cannot rely on uncharged 
conduct to impose discipline. Pearl v. Bd. olProf Disc. q(the Idaho State Bd. ofMed., 137 
Idaho 107, 114, 44 P.3d 1162, 1170 (2002)(Physician is entitled to due process safeguards in a 
disciplinary proceeding which include the right to be fairly notified of the issues to be 
considered.); Krueger v. Bd. o( Prof Disc., 122 Idaho 577, 836 P.2d 523 (l 992)(Where a 
decision is based on allegations of which the physician has not received notice, the decision 
should be overturned as a denial of due process). In Pearl, this Court looked to several specific 
allegations in the complaint, and specifically held that the Board's reliance on violations that 
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were not specifically pied '·violated Dr. Pearls' due process rights by considering this evidence." 
137 Idaho at 115, 44 P.3d at 1170. 
The Board argues that the Pearl and Krueger cases are distinguishable because they 
addressed standard of care. See Respondent's Brie±: p. 21. The right to due process is not 
determined by the statute under which the allegation is charged, it is determined by the factual 
allegations in the complaint. Pearl, 13 7 Idaho at 114, 44 P .3d at 1169; citing H & V 
Engineering, Inc., v. Idaho State Board qfProfessional Engineers, 113 Idaho 646, 747 P.2d 55 
(1987); Grindstone Butte Mut. Canal Co. v. Idaho Power Co., 98 Idaho 860,574 P.2d 902 
(1978). 
The Board also argues that the repeated reliance on uncharged conduct is not relevant 
because the complaint alleged behavior with patients, not minors. See Respondent's Brief, p. 22. 
Of particular note, in Pearl, several allegations were overturned when they relied in part upon 
uncharged conduct, and in part on charged conduct. See 13 7 Idaho at 114, 44 P .3d at 1169 
(addressing counts III and VI). The Court overruled the findings even when the allegations in 
the complaint were supported by evidence, if the Board also relied upon uncharged conduct. Id. 
("The Board's decision is based, at least in part, on matters not alleged in the complaint. This was 
a due process violation.'") 
Other than the single claim that was proven wrong, no allegation in the complaint 
addresses any behavior with any minor. Notwithstanding such, the Board plainly relied heavily 
on such. Under Pearl, any reliance upon uncharged conduct, even if there is evidence of charged 
conduct. violates Dr. Pines' right to due process. Id. 
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Based upon the plain guidance from Pearl, Krueger and a long line of cases addressing 
the precise issue, this matter should be dismissed. 
b. Dismissal is the appropriate remedy for due process violations. 
The Board next argues that '"there is at most an inconsistency in the factual findings" and 
that '"it is well established that inadequate findings must be remanded to the board for further 
proceedings." See Respondent's Brie±: p. 22. This argument is not consistent with Idaho law. 
In Woodfield, cited by the Respondent, the Court of Appeals remanded only the portion 
of the Order addressing why the Board departed from the hearing officer's conclusions. 
Woodfield v. Board of Professional Discipline of Idaho State Bd. ofMedicine, 127 Idaho 738, 
747,905 P.2d 1047, 1056 (Ct.App. 1995) ("We affirm the remand order of the district court 
directing the Board to delineate its own findings as the basis for its contrary conclusion to that of 
the hearing officer."). Notably, on the charge related to the claim which lacked substantial 
evidence, the Court ruled that "We uphold and adopt the district court's ruling overturning the 
Board's conclusion that Dr. Woodfield breached the standard of care by conducting an 
excessively long vaginal ultrasound on patient 12." ld. at 746, 905 P.2d at 1055. 
In Laurino, also cited by the Respondents, this court overturned seven of nine allegations 
from the Board and expressly overturned the revocation of the physician's license. Laurino v. 
Board of Professional Discipline o_ffdaho State Bd. o_fMedicine, 137 Idaho 596, 51 P.3d 410 
(2002). As to the two counts which were sustained, this Court "remand[ ed] the case for a new 
detennination by the Board as to an appropriate sanction that should be imposed:· Id. at 600, 51 
P .3d at 414. This Court did not remand the case to allow the Board to issue new findings of fact 
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on the dismissed claims, but only the two which were ruled to be supported by substantial 
evidence. Id. 
Consistent with Laurino and Woodfield, this Court has consistently held that dismissal is 
the appropriate remedy: 
The Board violated Cooper's due process rights by disciplining 
him for acts which were not charged in the complaint. In addition, 
the Board's finding .. .is not adequately supported by substantial 
evidence on the record as a whole. Therefore, the decision of the 
Board is reversed. We remand to the Board of Professional 
Discipline for dismissal of this disciplinary action. 
Cooper v. Board of Professional Discipline o_f'Idaho State Bd. of' Medicine, 134 Idaho 449, 456, 
4 P .3d 561, 568 (2000). Just as in Cooper, in Pearl, this Court dismissed the Board rulings that 
violated the doctor's due process rights. Pearl v. Bd. of Prof Disc. of the Idaho State Bd. of' 
Med., 137 Idaho 107, 118, 44 P.3d 1162, 1173 (2002). In Krueger, this Court struck the Board 
rulings that relied on unpled conduct. Krueger v. Bd. of Prof Disc. of Idaho State Bd. of'Med., 
122 Idaho 577, 582-583, 836 P.2d 523, 528-529 (1992). 
The appropriate remedy for the violations of Dr. Pines' due process rights is a remand 
with an order to dismiss this action. It is not a "do over" to cure the constitutional violations. 
c. Even if the Complaint alleged activities :related to minors, there is no substantial 
evidence to support the Board's findings. 
The Board concedes that there was no evidence of illicit activities with minors: '·The 
undisputed evidence is that all of the patients were just over 18 ... ,. See Respondent's Brief. p. 
21; see also p. 25. ("'The undisputed evidence establishes, the sexual contacts occurred after each 
of the four individuals was over the age of 18:·) 
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Given the burden of proof in a physician disciplinary proceeding is the ··clear and 
convincing" evidence, the Board's admission now indicates that the many references relative to 
minors in the Final Order are not supported by substantial evidence. Idaho Code § 54-1814(7). 
Laurino v. Ed. of Prof Disc. offdaho State Ed. ofMed., 137 Idaho 596,601, 51 P.3d 410,415 
(2002). As explained above, when due process violations are coupled with a lack of substantial 
evidence, dismissal is the appropriate remedy. 
Because there is no evidence to support the many conclusions related to minors, the 
Board's ruling violates Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3)(d), Laurino, and Peckham v. Idaho State Ed. c~f 
Dentistry, 154 Idaho 846, 303 P .3d 205 (2013), as it is not based upon substantial evidence, and 
is certainly short of the clear and convincing burden of proof. 
d. Dr. Pines has not waived the right to challenge the constitutionality of the statutes 
and regulations as applied. 
The Final Order largely relies on the conclusion that all four of the complaining witnesses 
were "patients.'· See Agency R., Final Order, pp. 2-3. The Board's conclusion violates 
fundamental principles of due process as applied. The appeal on this issue is brought pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3 ), which allows review of actions which "violate statutory or 
constitutional provisions.'· The Board asserts that this argument has been waived because it was 
not presented to the hearing officer. See Respondent's Brief, p. 24. Notably, the Board does not 
even address the statutory basis for the challenge, or offer the same argument in relation to the 
Appellant's position that the Board has violated other elements ofldaho Code§ 67-5279(3). 
The Board's position relies upon the strained argument that Dr. Pines should have challenged the 
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conclusions of the Final Order before the Final Order was issued, on an issue over which the 
Board has no jurisdiction, which is expressly allowed by Idaho Code as appropriate for appellate 
review. 
The Court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences, conclusions, 
or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory 
authority; ( c) are made upon unlawful procedure; ( d) are not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3). 
The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner 
specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that pmiy has been prejudiced. 
Price v. Payette Cn(v. Bd. qfCnty. Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429,958 P.2d 583,586 (1998). 
Proceedings before the Board are controlled by the Attorney General's regulations for 
contested proceedings. See IDAPA 22.01.07.003. There is no provision in those regulations for 
challenging the constitutionality of the application of a regulation as applied in a Final Order 
before the Agency. In fact, the only auth01ity granted to the agency is to consider whether their 
own rules are within the agency's substantive rulemaking authority. See IDAPA 04.11.01.416, 
REVIEW OF RULES (RULE 416) ("When an order is issued by the agency head in a contested 
case, the order may consider and decide whether a mle of that agency is within the agency's 
substantive rulemaking authority or whether the rule has been promulgated according to proper 
procedure ... ''). 
Idaho Courts have long held that an agency cannot rule on the constitutionality of 
statutes, which is extended to their own rules. "[T]he agency was unable to consider the 
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constitutionality of the statute in question, because '[p ]assing on the constitutionality of statutory 
enactments, even enactments with political overtones, is a fundamental responsibility of the 
judiciary, and has been so since lvfarbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 13 7 [2 L.Ed. 60 
(1803)]."' Alcohol Beverage Control v. Boyd, 148 Idaho 944,946,231 P.3d 1041, 1043 (2010); 
see also American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862, 
871, 154 P.3d 433,442 (2007) (" ... the Director had no authority to rule on the constitutionality 
of the Rules. Although a district court has jurisdiction to decide constitutional issues, 
administrative remedies generally must be exhausted before constitutional claims are 
raised.")(emphasis added). This concept is plainly in line with the exception for exhausting 
administrative remedies when there is no process for such. See i.e. Fuchs v. State, Dept. ofldaho 
State Police, Bureau (dAlcohol Beverage Control, 272 P.3d 1257 (2012) (While pursuit of 
statutory administrative remedies is a condition precedent to judicial review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not a bar to 
litigation when there are no remedies to exhaust. West's LC.A.§ 67-5271.) 
The Board's practical position here is that Dr. Pines cannot argue that the Final Order 
violated his due process rights as applied because he did not raise the issue that the Final Order 
violated his due process rights before the agency issued the Final Order. Given Idaho caselaw 
plainly states that the director of an agency cannot rule on the constitutionality of its own 
agency's rules, and administrative remedies must be exhausted "before constitutional claims are 
raised;' the Respondent's position is without basis in law. American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 
v. Idaho Dept. of"Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862,871, 154 P.3d 433,442 (2007). 
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Dr. Pines has not waived his right to challenge the final decision based upon the plain 
grounds listed in Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3). There is no affirmative duty to plead the statutory 
grounds for review under the Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3), and there is not a single case in Idaho 
that supports the position. 
e. The Final Order violates Dr. Pines' constitutional right to due process as applied by 
concluding that the statutes and regulations were violated through contact with a 
"patient." 
Specific to the application of the statutes and regulations, the Board argues at length that 
"practice patients" are "patients." See Respondent's Brief, pp. 25-27. Though the Board cites to 
Idaho Code § 18-919 and the Board's own rulings, it does not address how a person who does 
not provide a diagnosis, understands that there is no desire for a diagnosis from the other party, 
and understands that no professional services are actually being provide, is put on notice by the 
statutes or regulations that he is in fact forming a doctor patient relationship. This is particularly 
the case here given the argument is not that they were actually patients, but only "practice 
patients." The statutes require an underlying attempt to treat, a relationship based on that 
underlying attempt to treat, and something more than a conclusion based upon the "expertise" of 
the Board. 
·'[A] statute is unconstitutionally vague when its language does not convey sufficiently 
definite warnings as to the proscribed conduct, and its language is such that men [ or women] of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning." Wyckoff v. Bd. of'Counzy 
Commissioners ofAda County, 101 Idaho 12, 15, 607 P .2d l 066, 1069 (1980): See also 
Keyishicm v. Bd. a/Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967). A statute may 
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be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a defendant's conduct. 
State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712, 69 P.3d 126, 132 (2003). Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 
P.3d at 132. To succeed on an "as applied" vagueness challenge, a complainant must show that 
the statute, as applied to the defendant's conduct, failed to provide fair notice that the defendant's 
conduct was proscribed or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police had 
unbridled discretion in determining whether to arrest him. Id. The doctrine is equally applicable 
to statutes prescribing a standard of conduct which, though not subject to criminal sanctions for 
violations thereof, is subject to regulation by an administrative board or agency. Tuma v. Bd. of 
Nursing, 100 Idaho 74, 79, 593 P.2d 711, 716 (1979). 
Practicing medicine is to "investigate, diagnose, treat, correct or prescribe for any human 
disease, ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity or other condition, physical or mental, by any 
means or instrumentality." Idaho Code§ 54-1803(1). Idaho Code§ 18-919 applies to actions 
"with a patient or client." Idaho Code§ 18-919(a). A medical care provider "means a person 
who gains the trust and confidence of a patient or client for the examination and/or treatment 
of a medical or psychological condition, and thereby gains the ability to treat, examine and 
physically touch the patient or client.,. Idaho Code § 18-9 l 9(b )( emphasis added). 
Idaho Code § 54-1814(7) applies to the ·'provision of health care." Section (21) only 
applies to "any act constituting a felony or commission of any act constituting a crime involving 
moral turpitude." Idaho Code § 54-1814(21 ). The following section prohibits ·'any conduct 
which constitutes an abuse or exploitation of a patient arising out of the trust and confidence 
placed in the physician by the patient." Idaho Code § 54-1814(22). 
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IDAPA 22.01.01.101.04 applies to '·any conduct which constitutes an abuse or 
exploitation of a patient arising out of the trust and confidence placed in the physician by the 
patient:' IDAPA 22.01.01.101.04. The regulation states that its application is limited to patients 
or former patients no less than six times. Id. 
This Court's guidance on this precise issue is directly on point: 
In Tuma and H & V, we held that the administrative boards could 
not rely merely on their own expertise, experience and collective 
knowledge, but must articulate clear standards which will warn the 
professional as to which acts are unlawful. 
Krueger v. Bd. of Prof Disc. ofldaho State Bd. ofMed., 122 Idaho 577,581,836 P.2d 523,527 
(1992). 
The Board argues at length that because the witnesses were ·'practice patients," the 
statutes and regulations apply. The arguments focus extensively on the expertise and 
conclusions of the Board, but does not meaningfully address how it is a physician is put on 
notice that a violation may be found when neither the physician, nor the person communicating 
with the physician, think that a doctor patient relationship exists. See Respondent's Brief, p. 26. 
As explained below, each of the witnesses testified that there was no attempt to diagnose 
or treat, that Dr. Pines was not their physician, and that the relationship they did share with Dr. 
Pines arose outside the doctor patient context. 
This reliance upon the Board's ··expertise'· rather than the statutes or evidence presented 
is precisely the due process violation at issue in this case. How is it that a person could 
understand that the statutes apply when there is no action taken to .. practice medicine'· under the 
Medical Practices Act, no trust derived from a doctor-patient relationship. and no understanding 
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by any party involved that any actual malady is being treated? Where is it in Idaho law that a 
practice patient is a patient? 
Dr. Pines was not attempting to investigate, diagnose, treat, or con-ect anything. LC. § 
54-1803(1 ). He did not gain the trust of any of the complaining parties "for the examination 
and/or treatment of a medical or psychological condition." Idaho Code § l 8-9 l 9(b ). Because he 
did not treat anything, and did not violate Idaho Code § 18-919, there was no underlying c1ime to 
justify discipline under Idaho Code § 54-1814. 
Neither the statutes nor the regulation apply to non-patients or relationships that were not 
founded in the doctor patient context. Because the statutory and regulatory language do not 
place a physician on notice that he can be disciplined when neither party thinks there is a doctor 
patient relationship, or when he is not diagnosing or treating maladies, the statutes and regulation 
failed to provide fair notice that the defendant's conduct was proscribed. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 
712, 69 P.3d at 132. 
As applied, the Board has violated Dr. Pines constitutional right to due process in its 
application of Idaho Code§§ 18-919, 54-1814 and ID APA 22.01.01.101.04. It therefore is in 
excess of statutory authority, violates the statutory provisions, and is hence arbitrary, capricious, 
and an abuse of discretion. 
f. Because there was no evidence that the source of any trust that existed arose from a 
doctor patient relationship, the Board's application of the statutes and regulation is 
not supported by substantial evidence and is arbitrary and capricious. 
Trusting someone because they are a doctor does not mean that the basis of the trust arose 
in the doctor patient context. 
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The Board argues that "all four men unequivocally testified, and the Hearing Officer and 
Board found, the only reason they agreed to the naked massages was because they trusted Dr. 
Pines when he told them he needed to do the naked massages and physical exams to further his 
medical licensure and Board certification." See Respondent's Brief: p. 26. The application of 
the relevant statutes does not rely upon whether the witnesses trusted Dr. Pines. The application 
of Idaho law requires that the underlying trust arose from a doctor-patient relationship. 
Idaho Code § 18-9 I 9 addresses "sexual exploitation by a medical care provider." Idaho 
Code l 8-9 l 9(b )(2). A "medical care provider" is someone "who gains the trust and confidence 
of a patient or client for the examination and/or treatment of a medical or psychological 
condition, and thereby gains the ability to treat, examine and physically touch the patient or 
client." Idaho Code l 8-9 l 9(b )(2). 
Idaho Code § 54-1814 bars "Engaging in any conduct which constitutes an abuse or 
exploitation of a patient arising out of the trust and confidence placed in the physician by the 
patient.'· Idaho Code § 54-1814(22)( emphasis added). The regulation minors Idaho Code § 54-
1814. See IDAPA 22.01.01.101.4.d. 
Without proving that the underlying relationship arose in the doctor patient context, the 
Board cannot prove a violation of Idaho Code § 54-1814 or the regulation. See Levin v. Idaho 
State Bd. of Med., 133 Idaho 413,987 P.2d 1028 (1999). In Levin, the court ruled that 
consensual sexual relationship between adults was not a violation of Idaho Code § 54-1814(22) 
because the relationship of trust that existed between the patient and the doctor arose in a social 
setting. The Court properly ruled that "regulation 101.04.d was not breached based upon the 
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hearing officer's determination that there was no showing that there was an exploitation of KE 
arising out of the trust and confidence placed by KE in Dr. Levin as a physician." 133 Idaho at 
418, 987 P.2d at 1033. 
Because the Board did not provide evidence that the source of any trust that did exist 
arose through a doctor patient relationship, the Board failed to carry its burden of proof, and 
applied the statutes and regulations in an arbitrary and capricious manner. It is not enough to 
allege that the parties trusted him, and that he was a doctor. There must be a nexus to violate the 
statutes and regulations. 
g. The Board failed to carry its burden of proving the allegations in the complaint by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
Because the Final Order fails to reconcile the Board's conclusions with the actual 
evidence in the record, and their conclusion contradicts that evidence, this matter must be 
dismissed because the Board has failed to fulfill the burden of proving its case by clear and 
convincing evidence. The Board responds to this argument by misstating the Appellant's 
arguments. See Respondent's Brief p. 35. Dr. Pines does not argue that there was no ongoing 
regular physician relationships. He has simply pointed out that the Board's own evidence does 
not support their Final Order. No witness testified that they were a patient at the time of the 
alleged misconduct. The Board's own expert testified that there must be an attempt to diagnose 
to form a patient relationship. The Board simply disregarded the actual evidence and replaced it 
with their own interpretation of the law. 
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The burden of proof in a physician disciplinary proceeding is the "clear and convincing" 
standard. Idaho Code§ 54-1814(7). Laurino v. Bd. of Prof Disc. of Idaho State Bd. of Med., 137 
Idaho 596,601, 51 P.3d 410,415 (2002); Cooper v. Bd. ofPrc~f Disc. ofldaho State Bd. of 
Med., 134 Idaho 449, 4 P.3d 561(2000). In Cooper, the Court ruled that the failure to reconcile 
contradictory evidence failed the clear and convincing burden of proof: 
J .H. 's testimony cannot be reconciled with exhibits and testimony 
from other witnesses. The Board did not find that the witnesses as 
to Cooper's activities on November 24 were not credible. Neither 
did it explain the discrepancies between J.H.'s testimony and the 
exhibits. Accordingly, the Board did not meet its burden of 
showing that Cooper violated Idaho Code § 54-1814(22) by 
having a sexual encounter with J.H. 
id. at 456, 4 P.3d at 568. In Cooper, this Court overturned and dismissed the Board's ruling 
because it failed to address the contradictory evidence in the record. 
Here, the Board has chosen to conclude that the relevant statutes and regulations were 
violated because the witnesses were "patients." Though, no witness testified that they were a 
patient of Dr. Pines when the events occurred. N.R. agreed that he was "never a patient." See 
Tr., Vol. I, p. 47, 1. 21. S.G. testified that Dr. Pines ··was never my doctor." Id. p. 110, 11. 24-25. 
D.P. testified that Dr. Pines was his doctor at the Northwest Children's Home, but not thereafter. 
and he did not know he was a psychiatrist. Id. at 110-111. B.H. testified unequivocally that he 
never had a doctor patient relationship with Dr. Pines, and stated that any relationship that did 
exist arose socially. Id. at 182. The Board's expert Dr. McPherson, testified that ··using their 
skills as a physician or a nurse practitioner to make or rule out diagnoses" creates a 
patient/doctor relationship. See Tr., Vol. III, p. 430. 
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In Cooper, the Board failed to reconcile contradictory evidence. Here, the Board simply 
chose to ignore the evidence in the record, and based its conclusions on its own expertise in 
direct contradiction to their own witnesses. There is no evidence that the witnesses were 
patients. As such, the Board has failed to reconcile the actual evidence, and hence failed to 
fulfill its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence any of the allegations in the 
complaint. Under Cooper, it should be dismissed. 
h. The rejection of the Hearing Officer's Recommended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law lacks the appropriate foundation. 
The Order states that "the Board rejected the Hearing Officer's Recommended Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of law." See Agency R., Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Final Order, p. 2 ("Final Order"). The Board now argues that the Board only rejected the legal 
conclusion that "practice patients·' \Vere not "patients." See Respondent's Brief, p. 27. 
This is contrary to the unequivocal statements in the Board's Final Order. 
"The Board Rejects the Hearing Officer's Recommended Findings 
of Facts and Conclusions oflaw." See Final Order, p. 2 
"After consideration and discussion, the Board rejected the 
Hearing Officer's Recommended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions c~l Law (hereinafter Recommended Findings) issued 
on February 13, 2013 after concluding the Hearing Officer 
immeasurably failed to comprehend the principal issues in this 
case." Id. p. 2 
"'The law is clear that the Board is not bound by the Hearing 
Officer's Recommended Findings or subjective opinions." Id. 
''The Hearing Officer's unauthorized and subjective 
opinions/recommendations should be rejected.'' Id. p. 3. 
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"The Board took major exception to the Hearing Officer's opinion 
that none of Dr. Pines interactions with the four ( 4) boys could be 
said to 1ise to the level of any inappropriate or unethical sexual 
activity.'· Id. p. 4 
"The Board, therefore, rejects all of the Hearing Officer's 
subjective opinions ... ·· Id. 
The Court of Appeals states that the reviewing court "will scrutinize the Board's findings 
of fact more critically if they contradict the [hearing officer's] conclusions than if they accord 
with the (hearing officer's] findings." Woodfield v. Board o_f Professional Discipline o.f Idaho 
State Bd. o_fMedicine, 127 Idaho 738, 746-747, 905 P.2d 1047 (Ct.App. 1995). 
The Board is also required by Idaho Code§ 67-5248 to provide "A reasoned statement in 
support of the decision. Findings of fact, if set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied 
by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts of record supporting the findings." 
See Idaho Code§ 67-5248. 
The Order's rejection in whole of the Recommended Findings, and the present reversal of 
that position, categorically fails to provide the required statutory elements. While the Board now 
argues that the Hearing Officer actually was correct in some of his conclusions, there is no 
reasoned decision in the Final Order which justifies the wholesale rejection of the Hearing 
Officer's work, or particular findings of fact to support such. 1 See Respondent's Brief, p. 27. 
Under Woodfield, the Board has not failed to address this contradiction in the actual evidence, 
the Final Order should be set aside and this action dismissed. 
1 This is particularly clear now given the Board has admitted that there was no evidence of illicit activities with 
minors, yet relied on exactly that to justify its departure from the Hearing Officer's recommendations in the Final 
Order. 
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i. The Board is required to address the actual evidence related to each count. 
The Board responds to particular arguments related to each count by arguing that the 
points raised therein are "merely repetitive'' and ·'will not be reargued.'' See Respondent's Brief, 
p. 36. The Board has a statutory duty to include "a concise and explicit statement of the 
underlying facts ofrecord supporting the findings.'' Idaho Code§ 67-5248. For each of the 
complaining parties, the evidence creates distinct issues that must be addressed. 
i. Count I: N.R. 
Count I alleges that Dr. Pines has violated the Medical Practices Act because he 
"committed an act constituting a felony or committed and act constituting a crime of moral 
turpitude in violation ofldaho Code §54-1814(21) and Idaho Code§ 18-919." See Agency R., 
Complaint, p. 2. Count I also pleads that Dr. Pines "has abused or exploited his position as a 
physician to engage in improper sexual contact in violation of Idaho Code § 54-1814(22) and 
IDAPA 22.01.01.101.04.d." Id. 
Title 54 violations only apply to felonies and crimes (21 ), and to patients (22). Idaho 
Code § 54-1814. Idaho Code § 18-919 applies to "patients or clients." The regulation is limited 
to patients, clients, and actions "related to the practice of medicine." ID APA 22.01.01.101.04.d. 
The "practice of medicine" is to "investigate, diagnose. treat, correct or prescribe for any human 
disease, ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity or other condition, physical or mental, by any 
means or instrumentality." Idaho Code § 54-1803(1 ). 
The Board's evidence on the matter was largely undisputed. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY AND 
CROSS RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 24 
N.R. testified that Dr. Pines was never his physician. See Tr., Vol. I, p. 47, 11. 16-21. He 
also testified that his relationship with Dr. Pines arose through a foster care placement. See Tr., 
Vol. I, p. 26. The Board's expert witness, Dr. McPherson, testified that a doctor patient 
relationship is created by using one's skills as a physician to ·'make or rule out a diagnoses." Id., 
Vol. III, p. 430. No evidence was presented that either Dr. Pines or N.R. thought that there was 
any effort to make or rule out a diagnosis. 
The Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's office determined that no crime was committed 
by Dr. Pines in relation to N.R. See Board's Ex. 4. The office declined prosecution because 
there was no doctor patient relationship and N.R. was an adult. See Tr., Vol. II, pp. 206, 297, 
298. See also Board's Ex. 4. 
The Hearing Officer concluded that "At the time of the encounter between Dr. Pines and 
N.R. in January of 2011 there is no basis to find or conclude that N.R. was a patient of Dr. 
Pines." See Agency R., Recommended Findings, p. 7. He also concluded that "There is no 
evidence in this case that the trust alluded to by N.R. in his testimony of Dr. Pines resulted from 
any physician patient relationship." See Agency R., Recommended Findings, p. 8. 
N.R, the Board's expert, the prosecuting attorney, and the Hearing Officer all determined 
that there was no underlying doctor patient relationship, no basis of trust arising from such, and 
hence no crime. No evidence countered this testimony. Under Idaho Code §54-1814(21) and 
Idaho Code § 18-919, there is no evidence that either a felony or a crime involving moral 
turpitude was committed, or that Dr. Pines engaged in an act of sexual contact with a patient or 
client. Further, if the person with whom sexual conduct occurs is not a patient, and there was no 
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action taken to actually '·practice medicine," neither the statute nor the regulation apply. See 
Idaho Code§ 54-1814(22); IDAPA 22.01.01.101.04.d.2 
As such, all claims in Count I fail. The Board cannot simply disregard the evidence and 
replace it with their own "expertise.·, 
ii. Count II: D.P 
While concluding that D.P. was a patient for all purposes in this matter, the Board fails to 
reconcile contradictory evidence, overrides the plain language of the statutes, and ignores key 
evidence. Notably, D.P. and Dr. Pines engaged in a naked massage prior to any communications 
about "practice," without any connection whatsoever to any representations from Dr. Pines, and 
then continued a sexual relationship over time only once D.P. chose to '·play'· Dr. Pines for 
money. 
The first allegation in Count II pleads that Dr. Pines "has provided health care which fails 
to meet the standard of health care provided by other qualified physicians in the same or similar 
communities," in violation ofldaho Code§ 54-1814(7) and IDAPA 22.01.01.101.04.d. See 
Agency R., Complaint, p. 3; Order Correcting Clerical Errors. The second allegation in Count II 
is that Dr. Pines has "engaged in conduct which constitutes abuse or exploitation of a patient 
arising out of the trust and confidence placed in a physician by the patient, in violation of Idaho 
Code§ 54-1814(22) and IDAPA 22.01.01.101.4.d." See Agency R., Complaint, p. 3. The third 
2 Idaho Code 54-1814(22): "(22) Engaging in any conduct which constitutes an abuse or exploitation of a patient 
arising out of the trust and confidence placed in the physician by the patient.'' Idaho Code~ 54-1814(22). The 
regulation bars "engaging in any conduct that constitutes an abuse of exploitation of a patient arising out of the trust 
and confidence placed in the physician by the patient. .. [and] Commission of any act of sexual contact, misconduct, 
exploitation or intercourse with a patient or former patient or related to the licensee· s practice of medicine." lDAP A 
22.01.01.101.4. 
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allegation related to D.P. (Count II) states that Dr. Pines "has committed an act constituting a 
felony or committed an act constituting a crime involving moral turpitude in violation of Idaho 
Code§ 54-1814(21) and Idaho Code§ 18-919." See Agency R., Complaint, p. 4. There was no 
finding relative to Idaho Code§ 54-1814(7) in the Final Order. See Agency R., Final Order. 
Idaho Code § 54-1814(22) does not apply to former patients. A current doctor patient 
relationship is "requisite." Woodfield v. Ed. of Pre~{' Disc. c~lthe Idaho State Ed. ofAled., 127 
Idaho 738,755,905 P.2d 1047, 1065 (1995). The Regulation applies to current patients, fonner 
patients who have been treated in the prior year, and, potentially, former patients with whom the 
"physician uses or exploits the trust, knowledge, emotions or influence derived from the prior 
professional relationship with the patient." IDAP A 22.01.01.101.4.d.iv. 
The analysis under both Idaho Code § 54-1814(22) and IDAP A 22.01.01.10 l.4.d requires 
the Board to prove the source of the relationship. The Code requires that abuse or exploitation 
must "aris[e] out of the trust and confidence placed in the physician by the patient.'" J.C. 54-
1814(22). See also Levin, supra. The regulation requires the Board to prove that the "physician 
uses or exploits the trust, knowledge, emotions or influence derived from the prior 
professional relationship with the patient." IDAPA 22.01.01.101.4.d.iv (emphasis added). 
Idaho law holds that the Board must reconcile the contradictory evidence to fulfill its 
duties under Idaho Code§ 67-5279. See Cooper v. Ed. ol Prof' Disc. c~lthe Idaho State Ed. of 
Med., 134 Idaho 449,457, 4 P.3d 561, 569 (2000). It also holds that findings based upon witness 
credibility requires '·an adequate explanation of the grounds for the reviewing body's source of 
APPELLANT'S REPLY AND 
CROSS RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 27 
disagreement with the [hearing ofiicer]." Woodfield v. Bd. of Pre~/ Disc. <~/'Idaho State Bd. c~f 
Med., 127 Idaho 738, 905 P.2d 1047 (Ct.App. 1995). 
D.P. testified that the basis of his relationship with Dr. Pines was as a foster child for 
respite care. See Tr., Vol. I, p. 108. He also testified that while in foster care, Dr. Pines did not 
provide any medical care or treatment. Id. at 111-112. He then stated that the reason he 
contacted Dr. Pines as an adult was solely to get money. Id. at 122, 126, 134. D.P. testified that 
the first time he and Dr. Pines engaged in a naked massage, he was an adult, seeking money from 
Dr. Pines, and there was no representation of any kind made by Dr. Pines relative to being a 
"practice patient." See Tr., Vol. I, p. 124. From that point forward, D.P. freely admitted that he 
was ·'playing him" for money. See Tr., Vol. I, p. 136. 
The Hearing Officer concluded that "The record indicates that Dr. Pines had ceased being 
D.P.'s treating psychiatrist for a period of at least two years and for as much as three to four years 
before any sexual contacts:· See Agency R., Recommended Findings, p. 16. 
Under Woodfield, the Board is required to provide an explanation as to why it chose to 
override the Hearing Officer's conclusions on credibility. Under Cooper, it has to reconcile 
contradictory evidence. Under Levin, it must show that the relationship must be founded in the 
doctor-patient context. 
The adult relationship was born of D.P. trying to get money from Dr. Pines, and predated 
the alleged ruse. Given the Board concluded that a doctor patient relationship existed 
throughout, some attempt to reconcile the contradictory evidence, or even address it, is 
mandated. 
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Because there was no evidence that D.P. was a patient at the relevant times, or that the 
relationship arose in a professional setting, the claim fails. 
iii. Count III: S.G. 
The first claim in Count III is that Dr. Pines "has committed an act constituting a felony 
or committed an act constituting a crime involving moral turpitude in violation of Idaho Code § 
54-1814(21) and Idaho Code§ 18-919." See Agency R., Complaint, p. 4. The second allegation 
is that Dr. Pines "abused or exploited his position as a physician to engage in improper sexual 
contact in violation ofldaho Code§ 54-1814(22) and IDAPA 22.01.01.101.04.d." See Agency 
R., Complaint, p. 4. 
S.G. testified that "he was never my doctor." See Tr., Vol. I, p. 92. He also stated that 
the contact "was not a medical exam whatsoever." Id. at 92. He also stated that no sexual 
contact occurred: "Q: Well, you never had any sexual contact with Dr. Pines. A: Right." Id. at 
92. He testified that he had received a massage from Dr. Pines, but the Doctor touched only 
portions of his body "other than my you know, my genitals and my butt ... [ and] never actually 
put his hands on anything." Id. at 86. 
Specific to S.G. the Hearing Officer "finds and concludes that the acts and conduct of Dr. 
Pines do not rise to the level of criminal conduct prohibited by those two code sections." See 
Agency R., Recommended Findings. p. 19. The Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's office 
determined that no crime was committed by Dr. Pines in relation to S.G. and declined 
prosecution because there was no doctor-patient relationship, and S.G. was an adult. See Tr., 
Vol. II, pp. 206, 297, 298. See also Board's Exhibit 4. The Board's evidence indicated that a 
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doctor patient relationship arises through treatment and diagnosis, not practice. See Tr., Voi. III, 
p. 430 (Dr. McPherson's testimony); See also Idaho Code§ 18-919(b)(2). 
Notwithstanding the evidence, the Board concluded otherwise. Under Cooper, it has to 
reconcile contradictory evidence. Under Levin, it must show that the relationship must be 
founded in the doctor-patient context. 
Without a doctor patient relationship, sexual contact, or actions related to the practice of 
medicine, there is no violation of the law or regulation. Idaho Code § 54-1814(22); IDAP A 
22.01.01.101.04.d. 
iv. Count V: B.H. 
1. The Board's own evidence proves that Count Five did not occur. 
Count V alleges that Dr. Pines "engaged in improper sexual contact with B.H., born 
when B.H. was 14-years-old at Respondent's cabin in Garden Valley." See Agency 
R., Complaint, p. 6, ,r22. The following allegations state that they violate the Idaho Medical 
Practice Act ·'as alleged in Paragraph 22." Id. p. 7. "The Board acknowledges that there was an 
error in the date alleged ... " See Respondent's Brief, p. 38. The Board then argues that Dr. Pines 
has waived the ability to challenge the "date error" because he did not object to the evidence 
presented at hearing. Id. 
The Board failing to prove the allegations is not a ·'date error,., it is a failure to carry its 
burden of proof. The burden of proof in a physician disciplinary proceeding is the "·clear and 
convincing" standard. Idaho Code § 54-1814(7). Laurino v. Bd. of Prof. Disc. cd1daho State 
Bd. of Med., 137 Idaho 596,601, 51 P.3d 410,415 (2002). 
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One cannot allege activities, prove that they did not occur as charged, and then claim 
waiver for their own failure to can-y the burden. Coupled with this failure to can-y their burden, 
if they now take the position that Dr. Pines was disciplined for conduct that was not pled, the 
imposition of discipline relies on uncharged conduct. 
2. Even if Count V alleged the contact that did occur, the claim still fails 
because no crime was committed. 
The first allegation of Count V, specific to B.H, states that Dr. Pines "has committed an 
act constituting a felony or committed an act constituting a crime involving moral turpitude in 
violation ofldaho Code§ 54-1814(21) and Idaho Code§ 18-919." See Agency R., Complaint, p. 
7. 
B.H. was never a foster child, and knew Dr. Pines through the latter's son. See Tr., Vol. 
I, p. 164. B.H. testified unequivocally that he never had a doctor patient relationship with Dr. 
Pines, and stated that any relationship that did exist arose socially. Id. at 168-169, 182 ("Q: You 
never had a doctor patient relationship with Dr. Pines, did you? A: I did not"). The Hearing 
Officer concluded that "the acts and conduct of Dr. Pines do not rise to the level of criminal 
conduct prohibited by those two code sections." See Agency R., Recommended Findings, p. 22. 
As to any actions ··related to the licensee's practice of medicine" under the regulation, 
B.H. testified that Dr. Pines requested help with a "massage therapy license." Id. at 174. B.H. 
specifically denied that it had to do with his osteopathic license. Id. ("Q. Was it the doctor of 
osteopath? A. No .. .it was massage therapist renewal, massage therapist license."). 
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The Board does not address the uncontested evidence that there was no provision of 
health care, there was no representation related to health care, and there was no doctor patient 
relationship per the parties. As there is no other evidence related to B.H, there is no evidence to 
support a finding that Dr. Pines violated Idaho Code§ 54-1814(22) or IDAPA 
22.01.01.101.04.d. The Board's conclusion otherwise is not supported by substantial evidence, 
is in excess of their statutory authority, violates the statutory provision, and is hence arbitrary, 
capricious, and an abuse of discretion. The conclusion also violates Idaho Code§ 67-5248 
because they do not provide a "concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts of record 
supporting the findings." Idaho Code § 67-5248. 
j. The District Court's rejection of the fee award must be sustained. 
The District Court overturned the Board· s fee award because there was no process to 
challenge such provided. The Board claims that "the procedure followed by the Board complied 
with the Attorney General's Rules." See Respondent's Brief, p. 40. As noted by the District 
Court, this is not the case. Contrary to the Attorney General rules, the Final Order did not 
provide that fees would be awarded, and then allow the process outlined in the regulations. The 
Final Order awarded the fees outright. This is contrary to the Attorney General's regulations, 
barred by prior rulings of this Court, and violates Dr. Pines' due process rights. 
As noted by the District Court, the Final Order says ··or. Pines shall reimburse the Board 
of its costs and attorney fees in the amount of thirty-seven thousand seven hundred fifty-five 
dollars and seven cents ($37,755.07) within ninety (90) days of the date of the last signature 
below, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 54-1806[A](9)." See Agency Record, Final Order, p. 7; 
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Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 24. Attached to the Final Order was an Affidavit of 
Counsel outlining the fees. Id. 
The regulatory authority for awarding fees is well defined: 
02. Time for Filing for Costs and/or Fees Awarded in Final Order 
or Preliminary Order. Unless otherwise provided by statute or rule 
of the agency: (4-7-11) 
a. Minimum time for filing. When a final order or a preliminary 
order of the agency awards costs and/or fees to a party or to the 
agency itself, the agency must allow no fewer than fourteen (14) 
days from the service date of the final order or the preliminary 
order for the party to whom costs and/or fees were awarded or for 
the agency to file necessary papers ( e.g., a memorandum of costs, 
affidavits, exhibits, etc.) quantifying and otherwise supporting 
costs or fees, or both, that will be claimed or a motion to extend 
the time to file for costs and fees. 
ID APA 04.11.01.741.02 ( emphasis added). The plain language of the authorizing regulation 
requires a time for filing documentation of what "will be claimed." It plainly contemplates that a 
right to fees may be awarded, with a following due process procedure for determining the 
amount. This is also plainly shown by the section addressing Oppositions. IDAP A 
04.11.01.741.04 states: 
04. Oppositions. Unless otherwise provided by statute or rule of 
the agency, or extended by notice or order or the agency, 
oppositions to requests for costs and/or fees filed under 
Subsections 741.02 or 741.03 of this rule or motions to extend the 
time to oppose requests for costs and/or fees filed under 
Subsections 741.02 or 741.03 of this rule must be filed and served 
within fourteen ( 14) days of the service date of the petition to be 
timely. The agency may exercise its discretion to consider and 
grant an untimely opposition for good cause. 
IDAPA 04.11.01.741.04 (emphasis added). 
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In Hmv v. Idaho State Bd. olMedicine, this Court reversed an award of fees because the 
process did not provide for an opportunity to be heard in opposition. 140 Idaho 152. 159, 90 
P.3d 902, 909 (2004) ("None of those rules contain any provision giving the respondent 
physician an opportunity to be heard at all regarding the amount of costs and fees to be assessed 
by the Board. Under the Due Process Clause, Dr. Haw was entitled to that opportunity."). 
Here, under the regulations, there was no "request for costs and/or fees filed under 
Subsections 741.02" and there was no "petition" because the Board simply awarded all fees and 
attached the Affidavit to the Final Order. Under the Regulation, an "opposition" may only be 
filed in response to a "request" or a "petition." The Board's process foreclosed any ability to 
challenge the award. Under Haw and the regulation, there was no opportunity provided. 
The Board cannot now meaningfully argue that Dr. Pines waived the right to challenge a 
fee award that procedurally blocked his ability to challenge the award. 
Judge McLaughlin correctly ruled on this issue: 
It is not clear what procedure the Board utilized to assess fees and 
costs here. The Board appears to have already had a set amount in 
mind ($37,755.07), at the time of the award. There is no fee 
petition in the record and the exhibit the Board relied on in making 
this award ("Exhibit A") was already attached to the Board's order. 
In any event, it is not clear to the Court, that Dr. Pines was 
afforded an opportunity to be heard. prior to the Board's issuance 
of its order that he pay more than $37,000 in attorney fees and 
costs.'' 
See Agency R., Memorandum Decision and Order, pp. 25-26. 
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The Board argues that Dr. Pines has waived his right to challenge the fee award because 
he "was given notice an opportunity to request a hearing and waived his right to do so." See 
Respondent's Brief, p. 41. The Board ignores the fact that under the Attorney General 
regulations, there must be a "petition" or "request" filed first. There were none. Dr. Pines 
waived nothing because his duty to respond under the Rule did not arise given the Board skipped 
the due process procedure which provides for an opportunity to file an opposition. 
Further, the Board does not address the fact that Dr. Pines served his Petition to Reinstate 
Medical License and Vacate Decision ofldaho Board of Medicine upon the Idaho State Board of 
Medicine on June 12, 2013. See Agency Record, Petition. The Final Order was filed on June 4, 
2013. See Agency Record, Final Order. The Petition states that "Respondent further objects to 
and seeks to vacate the Order's determination that Respondent shall pay attorney's fees and costs 
in the amount of $37,755.07." Id. 
The District Court was correct is overturning the fee award and should be sustained. 
k. The foreign authority relied upon by the Board does not apply under Idaho law. 
Perhaps as a tacit acknowledgement that Idaho law does not provide for discipline in this 
situation, the Board relies upon Washington and Hawaii case law to support their findings that 
discipline may be imposed regardless of the actual understandings of the parties, or the presence 
of the practice of medicine. The Board argues that this Court should look to foreign jurisdictions 
to justify their conclusions that Dr. Pines violated Idaho Code. See Respondent's Briet: pp.33-
34. The actual law underlying the foreign case rulings is not addressed. This is particularly 
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suspect given the Washington and Hawaii statutes provide more broad authority to their Boards 
of Medicine than Idaho. 
In Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Bd., 818 P.2d 1062, 1068 (1991), the Washington 
Supreme Court considered the application of RCW 18.130.180. It ruled that criminal sexual 
conduct with a minor former patient could violate Washington's statute and justify disciplinary 
action against the Doctor. Id. RCW 18.130.180 is Washington's statute defining the grounds for 
discipline. It states: 
RCW 18.130.180 Unprofessional conduct. 
The following conduct, acts, or conditions constitute 
unprofessional conduct for any license holder under the 
jurisdiction of this chapter: 
(I) The commission of any act involving moral twpitude, 
dishonesty, or corruption relating to the practice of the 
person's profession, whether the act constitutes a crime or 
not. If the act constitutes a crime, conviction in a criminal 
proceeding is not a condition precedent to disciplinary 
action. 
RCW 18.130.180 ( emphasis added). The Court in Haley goes on to define what may be 
considered moral turpitude and specifically relies upon section (1) as the basis for its analysis. 
818 P.2d at 1070 ("we have little difficulty in concluding that Dr. Haley's conduct constituted 
unprofessional conduct under RCW 18.130.180(1 )"). As plainly stated in the Washington Code, 
"any act of moral turpitude'' may be the grounds for discipline, '·whether the act constitutes a 
crime or not.'' There is no limitation that the action be criminal under Washington Code. 
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This is not the case in Idaho. Idaho· s statute defining the !:,rtounds for discipline 
specifically requires that either a "felony," or a "crime of moral turpitude." I.C. 54-1814(21 ). 
The statutes are inapposite. Any application of Idaho Code related to committing an act of 
"moral turpitude'· is limited to a crime. That is not the case in Washington, and the caselaw from 
there is irrelevant. 
The Board next cites to an attorney discipline case from Washington which also relies on 
a statute that does not mirror Idaho law. See Respondent's Brief, p. 33; citing In re: 
Disciplinary Proceeding Against James A. Heard, 963 P.2d 818 (Wash. 1998). As stated plainly 
by Washington's Supreme Comi, that case again dealt with the imposition of discipline for "any 
act of moral turpitude." 963 P.2d at 824-825. Mr. Heard was disciplined for having sex with a 
current client, who was suffering from a traumatic brain injury and the subject of a guardianship 
that Heard had initiated. Just as in Haley, the underlying statute addressed "any act of moral 
turpitude.'' Idaho Code does not provide for discipline for "any act of moral turpitude,'' but 
rather, only for "any act constituting a crime involving moral turpitude .... " LC.§ 54-1814. 
Washington's more expansive rules are not even relevant to this matter. 
The Hawaiian case presented by the Board is likewise inapplicable. See Respondent's 
Brief, p. 34; citing Loui v. Board of Medical Examiners, 889 P .2d 705 (Hawaii 1995). The 
Board fails to acknowledge that the case has a two-fold requirement to justify discipline. Like 
Idaho, the first is a conviction, which was uncontested in thG Hawaii case. There, a physician 
was convicted of attempted first degree sexual abuse and kidnapping for actions taken against an 
employee. 889 P.2d at 707. Hawaii's statute authorizing discipline includes as a basis the 
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'·conviction ... of a penal offense substantially related to the qualifications. functions, or duties of 
a physician ... ,. Id. p. 708, citing HRS § 453-8(a). The Hawaii court cited to Haley for the 
second proposition, contrary to Idaho law, that "the conduct need not have occurred during the 
actual exercise of professional or occupational skills ... " Id. at 714; citing Haley, 818 P.2d at 
1069. While the court relied upon Haley for an analysis of whether his actions were related to 
the medical profession ( where "any act of moral turpitude" violates the statute), it eventually 
ruled definitively that because the person assaulted was an employee who was asked to come to 
his house to perform work on his medical records, the actions were "substantially related to his 
functions as a physician." Id. at 715. 
Idaho has no such statute or regulation that removes the limitation that the behavior need 
not be with a patient, former patient, or related "to the practice of medicine." There is no general 
prohibition of any action with any person which is either one of moral turpitude, or related to the 
one's "functions" as a physician. 
The Board seeks reliance on the foreign jurisdictions because Idaho law does not provide 
the basis for discipline. 
VI. Conclusion: 
The Medical Practices Act is limited to actions taken to "investigate, diagnose, treat, 
con-ect or prescribe for any human disease, ailment, injury, infinnity, deformity or other 
condition, physical or mental, by any means or instrumentality." Idaho Code § 54-1803( l ). 
Given neither the complaining parties nor the physician thought there was a doctor patient 
relationship, one is left to guess when the regulations or statutes apply. This interpretation is 
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beyond the Board's statutory authority, violates Dr. Pines' constitutional rights, and must be set 
aside. 
Dr. Pines' actions were neither criminal nor in violation ofregulation. The young men 
were not his patients, any trust that existed between them did not arise from being a patient, and 
there was no attempt to investigate, diagnose or treat anything. Given there was no attempt to 
diagnose or treat, Dr. Pines' behavior is not subject to discipline. The Board's conclusions are 
not supported by substantial evidence, exceed their statutory authority, violate the statutory 
provision, and are hence arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. The matter should be 
remanded with an order to dismiss. 
DATED This 9th day of October, 2014. 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, LEWIS, CASEY & SORENSEN, LLP 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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